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2. CRITICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
Social justice seems to be on the lips of everyone these days; however, the 
understanding of social justice differs greatly and with this diversity of 
meaning comes diversity of understanding. This paper will explore and 
deconstruct the points of contestation over competing definitions-
/meanings/understandings of social justice in education. The critical 
interpretation of social justice, according to the poststructuralist, is to examine 
the relationship between deconstruction and justice. Derrida's deconstruction 
of justice amplifies the problematisation of the foundations of law, morality and 
politics, for deconstruction has always attempted to show up the paradoxes 
structuring the philosophical discourse on a moral subject. Derrida observes 
that force is inscribed in the very concept of law, meaning there is no law 
without force. Legitimate force can be used by the lawgiver; it is inextricably 
bound to our legal and moral sense of justice (Sinnerbrink, 2006). To guide my 
argument, Derrida (1996) asserts that the authority of law has a “mystical” 
foundation: a foundation that makes justificatory discourse possible. For 
Derrida, the rule of law or justice, being as it is the product of historical 
circumstance, is socially constructed. He further asserts that social justice 
couched within the law sometimes fails in its aspiration to guarantee human 
rights and freedoms and is often used to sanction the brutal and treacherous 
actions of oppressive regimes (Dooley, 1999). 
To understand social justice in education, using Foucault's theoretical lens; he 
challenges hegemony in educational policies and practices, advocates 
educational reform and societal structures that move towards equity rather 
than marginalisation. An account of how I made use of Foucault's thinking in 
trying to understand the concept social justice in education follows my 
interpretation of Foucault's work on “parrhesia” translated from Greek into 
English as free speech, and “parrhesiastes” as a free citizen, not a slave who 
took on “parrhesiazesthai” i.e. the activity of free speech, saying everything 
that challenges the status quo and its structured relations of power (Huckaby, 
2008). The starting point of social justice, according to Foucault, is to 
challenge the power wielded by the strong unto the weak. For Foucault 
(1997), advocating social justice in education would mean for the benefit of 
people who live and are being educated under conditions of poverty, racial 
and ethnic disparities, in addition to discrimination because of their national 
origin and language. He maintains that to remain committed to the struggles of 
marginalized people, one needs to engage in the “games of truth” on 
educational and societal hegemony, challenging power relations that 
subjugate people and maintaining their “parrhesia”.
Foucault understands social justice in education as challenging hegemony, 
i.e. resistance within relations of power. This is significant for any educator, 
namely to address the needs of students and to know how the relations of 
power can work to the benefit of disadvantaged and marginalised students. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the first part of the paper I discuss the critical interpretation of social justice 
from poststructuralist and postmodernist perspectives. The focus is on social 
justice, in the context of a form of deconstruction that empowers the individual, 
with reference to the work of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. In the 
second part of the paper I discuss the conflation between two forms of justice: 
social and distributive justice. This leads, in the third part, to framing social 
justice in education, where I argue that it can be understood as a set of 
interrelated practices and that education practitioners should organise 
themselves against any form of exclusion or marginalisation, with reference to 
feminist and postmodernist discourses. In the fourth part of the paper, on the 
role of educators as critical instruments in social justice, I suggest that 
educators should be instrumental to eliminate inequalities, characterized by 
antisexist, antiracist and antihomophobic curricula; this is informed by the 
work of Peter McLaren and Kevin Kumashiro on anti-oppressive education. I 
conclude the paper by discussing the praxis of social justice in education, 
hopefully showing how social arrangements are imagined, constructed and 
challenged.
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Rather, power is not something “owned” but is the expression of a 
relationship, and it has to be analysed within a dynamic view of social relations 
and forces which produce power structures. In this section I argue that the 
consideration of distributive justice alone does not lead to social justice, 
meaning that the distribution of resources inappropriately restricts the scope 
of social justice, because it leaves untouched social relations and forms of 
injustice such as domination, coercion, marginalisation, exclusion, 
subjugation, oppression, deprivation and several forms of inequality.
As Young (1990) points out, distributive justice is not identical to social justice: 
there is a difference between giving everybody equal rights and equal 
opportunities within the existing oppressive system (i.e. distributive justice), 
and changing the conditions which gave rise to inequality or oppression in the 
first place (i.e. social justice). Critical scholars such as Derrida, Dooley, 
Foucault and Huckaby argue that we first need to question the agenda of 
curriculum of which each student has to have his/her share. The notable fact I 
wish to convey is that distributive justice and social justice are not equal, nor 
does the one cover the area of the other.
Distributive justice finds its strength in the egalitarian ideals where each 
person has an equal share, such as dispensation is necessary to justice. What 
seems to be absent from the egalitarian concept is the emancipatory 
emphasis found in social justice. Social justice seems to emphasise the 
liberation agenda that seeks to free people from segregation, marginalisation, 
disenfranchisement, exploitation, sexism, racism, xenophobia, homophobia, 
classism and all other sorts of injustices.
Young (1990) asserts that a paradigm shift is necessary when it comes to 
justice: we need to move away from the tradition that interprets justice in terms 
of the distribution of material goods and social positions. She challenges the 
distributive paradigm, arguing that social justice means the elimination of 
institutionalised domination and oppression. The paradigm should shift from 
distributive patterns to issues of participation in deliberation and decision-
making. She further argues that social justice has a particular interest in 
oppression and domination as the social conditions that define injustice, 
acting as the institutional constraints on self-development, total emancipation 
and self-determination. 
Enslin (2006) emphasises that this approach to justice has clear relevance to 
justice in education, acknowledging that the unequal distribution of funds for 
school facilities, teacher education and learning support materials is an 
indicator of inequality when it comes to different social classes, different 
genders and different ethnic and cultural groups. Enslin's theorisation that, if 
we want to pursue the agenda of social justice in education, it requires not only 
that oppression, disenfranchisement, subjugation and marginalisation in 
various shapes and sizes be done away with but also that democracy be 
pursued, as it forms the foundation of and the condition for social justice.
He also offers, not a way out, but another view of relations of power through 
resistance to power relations in the formation of freedom. Foucault states, 
If one of them were completely at the other's disposal and became his thing, an object 
on which he could wreak boundless and limitless violence, there wouldn't be any 
relations of power. Thus, in order for power relations to come into play, there must be at 
least a certain degree of freedom on both sides… This means that in power relations 
there is necessarily the possibility of resistance because if there were no possibility of 
resistance, there would be no power relations at all. (Foucault, 1997: 292) 
I regard Foucault's discourse as important in order for me to conceptualise 
social justice in education where educators challenge hegemony and critically 
question unjust social systems, as well as to understand how research 
methodologies, findings and theories support inequality. 
Social justice in education can also be understood as countering dominant 
power relations by enabling individual storytelling, thereby “creating a 
platform” for those usually assumed to be without it; these elements are 
central to the social justice in education objectives. Social justice in education 
does not treat power as the property of the more powerful who afford it to the 
relatively powerless, however, it challenges the more powerful – who obtained 
their power by dominating available air spaces (Griffiths, 2003). She further 
asserts that “giving voice is just a kind ventriloquism; or that hearing the voice 
of relatively powerless people gives relatively more powerful ones a 
management tool with which to control them.” (Griffiths, 2003: 84), given the 
fact that there is more than one understanding of power and empowerment.
Based on the above interpretation of what is social justice in education, it 
seems the concept is open to myriad interpretations. The meaning of the 
concept social justice in education is challenging because of its use across 
diverse theoretical or conceptual understanding. It seems scholars have 
conflated the idea of social justice with the notions of distributive justice. The 
following sections will attempt to iron out the differences that seem to exist 
between the understanding or meaning of the two contested 
terrains/paradigms/conceptual frameworks, i.e. social justice and distributive 
justice. 
3. CONFLATION BETWEEN THE TWO FORMS OF JUSTICE: 
SOCIAL AND DISTRIBUTIVE
Young (1990) asserts that people who are located within the framework of a 
distributive paradigm argue for equality of distribution; when it is met, their 
claims for justice are completely satisfied. It seems that distributive paradigm, 
set goals of assuring students' equal access to the same materials. However, 
social justice, in short, is not something to be handed down or to be received. 
Power, which is the essential “good” of social justice, cannot be seen as being 
distributed by some superior agency. 
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Postmodernists point to logo-centrism and pay particular attention to the play 
of differences or the absence thereof. They do not regard equality, whether 
defined as equal treatment for equals or as due process for all, as necessarily 
essential to justice (Lyotard and Thebaud, 1985). They also question the 
definition and conceptualisation of reason in transcendental grounding and 
the claim that liberation, justice and equality are not based on static meaning, 
but that self-understanding and social justice in education depend on the 
primacy of reason (Flax, 1993). Postmodernists further argue that it is 
unnecessary – and even dangerous – to assume that the existence and 
practice of social justice require any transcendental grounding.
Postmodernists (see Derrida, 1978 and 1981, Habermas, 1985, Lyotard, 
1984 and 1985) claim that they are committed to freeing the play of difference 
and such play cannot be wide-ranging when relations of domination are 
pervasive. They argue that for social justice to be realised in education there is 
a need for disruptions and the erosion of power of the grand narratives or 
discourses. This process will contribute to the clearing of spaces in which 
tensions exist. This means that social justice in education will emphasise 
discourses for self-determination, empowering language and the invention of 
an education curriculum that is empowering.
Social justice in education can also be understood as the possibility of modes 
of relatedness with others and to reconcile us or to make us welcome the 
existence of gaps between ourselves and others; it teaches us how to 
reconcile or tolerate differences between ourselves and others without 
domination, how to differ from others, and how to challenge the limits or 
restrictions placed on us by others (Flax, 1990). Social justice then is 
understood as a dynamic process rather than a fixed or frozen set of 
procedures or predetermined standards to which we must conform. Social 
justice in education in this paper is understood as a human rights issue, as 
pronounced in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. This is the 
right not to be discriminated against. This guarantees everyone the kind of 
education that does not discriminate on the grounds of differences and 
capabilities. According to Habermas (1985) rights express relationships, not 
things; they are constructed via processes of social struggle, mutual 
justification, and reciprocal recognition.
5. EDUCATORS AS CRITICAL INSTRUMENTS OF SOCIAL 
JUSTICE
Educators could play a pivotal role as instruments of social justice; however, 
they come to play with myriads of conflation of discourses which are 
internalised. Education for social justice could play a role in sensitising 
educators to have knowledge of “the other”. For educators to be models of 
social justice they should develop pedagogies of empowerment for 
transformation based on the understanding of power and privilege. 
I assume that if social justice is equated with distributive justice then social 
justice becomes meagre. We cannot equate social justice and distributive 
justice; even if absolute equality in educational opportunities can be achieved, 
social justice will continue to make demands – demands that fall outside the 
purview of distributive forms of justice. To cite an example of the South African 
education system due to the injustice of the colonisation crystallised in 
apartheid, education in this country has always been replete with injustices. 
The call for social justice in education is an attempt to address the social 
inequalities present in an unequal society. My understanding of social justice 
in education is that it is not only about promoting educational reform to 
perpetuate status quo norms of power and privileges acting in the name of 
social justice. Given the above conflation and tensions in understanding the 
two paradigms, my view is that social justice in education should address the 
social inequalities present in an unjust society or education institutions or 
practices. I theorised that social justice in education should retain its ability to 
disrupt and dismantle the surviving traces of injustice, whether in terms of 
unequal teaching, learning materials or other resources. Social justice in 
education is not about saving disenfranchised and marginalised people from 
domination and then oppressing one's enemies, because that would 
perpetuate injustice.
4. NUANCE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN EDUCATION
Social justice in education can be better understood as a set of interrelated 
practices; these forms of practices emphasise empathy, equality and the 
appreciation of otherness, which Derrida (1978) coined as différance, 
meaning that the sameness which is not identical is required for the effective 
exercising of social justice in education. Social justice practitioners in 
education should organise themselves against any form of exclusion and 
marginalisation, and these pedagogues have to focus on how social 
arrangements are imagined, constructed and challenged. Social justice in 
education should join the postcolonial chorus of voices that is opposed to 
individuals who are at the periphery and students who are outside spheres of 
power as opposed to those in the margin.
While the feminists and postmodernists have their own framing of social 
justice in education, each of these discourses has helped to increase our 
understanding of the tensions between conceptualisation, appeal and 
inadequacies of the understanding. Each of these discourses also gives us the 
picture about social arrangements or relations, and alternatives we ought to 
consider when interpreting and theorising about social justice in education. 
Feminists point to the pervasive effects of gender relations; they question 
whether equality is equivalent or a component of liberal theories of justice, 
where they have to assimilate pre-existing male norms (Flax, 1993). 
Feminists' argument is that universal sameness which is not identical is 
located within liberalism, which has a distinctly masculine character.
Journal for New Generation Sciences: Volume 10  Number 2
7 8
Postmodernists point to logo-centrism and pay particular attention to the play 
of differences or the absence thereof. They do not regard equality, whether 
defined as equal treatment for equals or as due process for all, as necessarily 
essential to justice (Lyotard and Thebaud, 1985). They also question the 
definition and conceptualisation of reason in transcendental grounding and 
the claim that liberation, justice and equality are not based on static meaning, 
but that self-understanding and social justice in education depend on the 
primacy of reason (Flax, 1993). Postmodernists further argue that it is 
unnecessary – and even dangerous – to assume that the existence and 
practice of social justice require any transcendental grounding.
Postmodernists (see Derrida, 1978 and 1981, Habermas, 1985, Lyotard, 
1984 and 1985) claim that they are committed to freeing the play of difference 
and such play cannot be wide-ranging when relations of domination are 
pervasive. They argue that for social justice to be realised in education there is 
a need for disruptions and the erosion of power of the grand narratives or 
discourses. This process will contribute to the clearing of spaces in which 
tensions exist. This means that social justice in education will emphasise 
discourses for self-determination, empowering language and the invention of 
an education curriculum that is empowering.
Social justice in education can also be understood as the possibility of modes 
of relatedness with others and to reconcile us or to make us welcome the 
existence of gaps between ourselves and others; it teaches us how to 
reconcile or tolerate differences between ourselves and others without 
domination, how to differ from others, and how to challenge the limits or 
restrictions placed on us by others (Flax, 1990). Social justice then is 
understood as a dynamic process rather than a fixed or frozen set of 
procedures or predetermined standards to which we must conform. Social 
justice in education in this paper is understood as a human rights issue, as 
pronounced in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. This is the 
right not to be discriminated against. This guarantees everyone the kind of 
education that does not discriminate on the grounds of differences and 
capabilities. According to Habermas (1985) rights express relationships, not 
things; they are constructed via processes of social struggle, mutual 
justification, and reciprocal recognition.
5. EDUCATORS AS CRITICAL INSTRUMENTS OF SOCIAL 
JUSTICE
Educators could play a pivotal role as instruments of social justice; however, 
they come to play with myriads of conflation of discourses which are 
internalised. Education for social justice could play a role in sensitising 
educators to have knowledge of “the other”. For educators to be models of 
social justice they should develop pedagogies of empowerment for 
transformation based on the understanding of power and privilege. 
I assume that if social justice is equated with distributive justice then social 
justice becomes meagre. We cannot equate social justice and distributive 
justice; even if absolute equality in educational opportunities can be achieved, 
social justice will continue to make demands – demands that fall outside the 
purview of distributive forms of justice. To cite an example of the South African 
education system due to the injustice of the colonisation crystallised in 
apartheid, education in this country has always been replete with injustices. 
The call for social justice in education is an attempt to address the social 
inequalities present in an unequal society. My understanding of social justice 
in education is that it is not only about promoting educational reform to 
perpetuate status quo norms of power and privileges acting in the name of 
social justice. Given the above conflation and tensions in understanding the 
two paradigms, my view is that social justice in education should address the 
social inequalities present in an unjust society or education institutions or 
practices. I theorised that social justice in education should retain its ability to 
disrupt and dismantle the surviving traces of injustice, whether in terms of 
unequal teaching, learning materials or other resources. Social justice in 
education is not about saving disenfranchised and marginalised people from 
domination and then oppressing one's enemies, because that would 
perpetuate injustice.
4. NUANCE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN EDUCATION
Social justice in education can be better understood as a set of interrelated 
practices; these forms of practices emphasise empathy, equality and the 
appreciation of otherness, which Derrida (1978) coined as différance, 
meaning that the sameness which is not identical is required for the effective 
exercising of social justice in education. Social justice practitioners in 
education should organise themselves against any form of exclusion and 
marginalisation, and these pedagogues have to focus on how social 
arrangements are imagined, constructed and challenged. Social justice in 
education should join the postcolonial chorus of voices that is opposed to 
individuals who are at the periphery and students who are outside spheres of 
power as opposed to those in the margin.
While the feminists and postmodernists have their own framing of social 
justice in education, each of these discourses has helped to increase our 
understanding of the tensions between conceptualisation, appeal and 
inadequacies of the understanding. Each of these discourses also gives us the 
picture about social arrangements or relations, and alternatives we ought to 
consider when interpreting and theorising about social justice in education. 
Feminists point to the pervasive effects of gender relations; they question 
whether equality is equivalent or a component of liberal theories of justice, 
where they have to assimilate pre-existing male norms (Flax, 1993). 
Feminists' argument is that universal sameness which is not identical is 
located within liberalism, which has a distinctly masculine character.
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He uses this concept to mean something empowering and disruptive and as a 
reminder for us to never stop asking: “What is the problematic norm?” and: 
“How do our practices contribute to oppression?” However, he seeks to 
sensitise educators to the fact that “queer theory” is not the prescription for 
better schools, but rather a way of thinking about them and questioning the 
anti-oppressive pedagogical thinking in all the subjects or learning areas that 
teachers. Educators need to question the prescriptive notions of education 
and to consider the role social justice education can play. 
McLaren (2005) also suggests some principles intended to provide educators 
with pivotal points of reference in the development of their social justice 
education practices: students must come to understand what the myths of the 
dominant discourses are: precisely myths which oppress and marginalise 
them but which can be transformative. Educators must consider the possibility 
for new makings of reality, the new makings are collectively shared, social 
enterprise in which the voices of all participants must be heard; and educators 
must get students to understand how the myths of the dominant discourses 
are: precisely myths which oppress and marginalise them but which can be 
transcended through transformative action (Nkoane 2009). The educator who 
is instrumental about social justice in education is critical about how 
knowledge and realities are constructed and will advocate human dynamics, 
fluidity of human interaction and relations, regarding the student as a 
speaking and interpreting being who has to be approached differently from 
objects in a science laboratory (see Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen and 
Kurzwell, 1985; Mahlomaholo and Matobako, 2006; Nkoane, 2009).
6. CONCLUSION
This paper draws attention to the ways in which various discourses 
conceptualise social justice in education. These discourses can lend to the 
social justice in education, with its reference to equality and empowerment, a 
tone similar to that of constructive disruption and the dismantling of 
hegemony; it also reminds us of how our unconscious practices contribute to 
oppression. I argue that social justice in education is not a prescription but that 
it enables us to question and rethink our education practices. I share the 
pedagogical philosophy that could assist in reducing the unconscious 
marginalisation and exclusion of “others” who are the same but not identical. 
This paper also demonstrates that power is only produced by human agency 
and this power is dangerous if its nature goes unchecked. For all the 
discourses that are left unspoken and unchallenged, many will be pushed 
further into the margins. This paper suggests then an activist's role to 
propagate the anti-oppressive education.
I conclude this paper by arguing for an inclusive social cooperation and social 
justice not reducible to distributive justice – a social justice without disrespect 
and the systematic disadvantages that some groups of people have to suffer. 
Pedagogy for empowerment raises questions about the relationship between 
the margins and centres of power in educational institutions, and is concerned 
with reclaiming power. It rejects the distinctions between high and popular 
culture so as to make curriculum knowledge responsive to everyday 
knowledge that diversely constitutes peoples' histories (Nkoane, 2009).
This paper theorises about social justice in education as a discourse 
supportive and sensitive to the plight of all human beings, especially those 
who have been oppressed, excluded and marginalised. McLaren (2008) 
argues that social justice in education is a way of thinking about, negotiating 
and transforming the relationships within classroom teaching, the production 
of knowledge, institutional structures of the school as well as the social and 
material relations of the wider community. Educators as instruments of change 
could eliminate inequalities on the basis of social class, characterised by a 
wide array of antisexist, antiracist and antihomophobic classroom-based 
curricula.
For social justice to bear fruit in education, not a single student should be 
treated as an object or means to an instrumental end. In keeping with the ideas 
of Giroux (2000) and other critical theorists, social justice has an important role 
to play in developing new forms of pedagogy and disputing the narrow ways in 
which knowledge is constructed. Educators as instruments of social justice 
represent a modern way to achieve enlightenment through reasoning and 
understanding students' live world experiences and what it means to be 
human. According to Quin (2009) the work of social justice educators explicitly 
aims to be anti-oppressive through seeking to empower educators and 
students to act in anti-oppressive ways for social justice. She further asserts 
that social justice education is about being and becoming a “social-justice” – 
not someone trying to behave in a “just” or “fair” manner.
When schools unconsciously support the dominant hegemony as well as 
classed, raced, gendered and sexist norms, Kumashiro (2004) reminds us 
(most especially educators) to work against such educational “common 
sense”. According to Kumashiro (2004: xxiii), “common sense does not tell us 
that this is what schools could be doing; it tells us that this and only this is what 
schools should be doing...” “It's just common sense that schools teach these 
things and students do those things.” Educators as instruments of change and 
social justice need to question both the purpose of schooling and why things 
are the way they are. Teachers must plant the seeds for social justice 
education by creating and fostering critical perspectives in education and 
shaking students' belief to the core. Educators need to be conscious of the 
way the “common sense” norms are passed on and disseminated and may 
begin to acknowledge their own oppressive pedagogies as well as to learn 
from this “unintended curriculum”.
Furthermore, Kumashiro (2004: 44-46) draws on “queer theory” for educators 
to have insight into education and to prepare them to be activists. 
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(For example: women segregated on the basis of their reproductive biology.) I 
also argue against the oppression experienced by homosexual people, just 
because our society and practices hold up heterosexual desire as normative; 
indeed. I reject any categorizing of some people as deviant, whatever norms 
(social or otherwise) we might choose to apply.
Finally I stand against any form of racial and ethnocentric domination, where 
the dominant discourse holds the norms of intelligence, respectability, 
trustworthiness and ingenuity as typical of “whiteness” rather than of 
“blackness”. With this I conclude my paper which attempted to publicise the 
discomforting truths and emotional terrain of trying to understand social justice 
in education.
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USING LIFE HISTORY TO UNDERSTAND THE INTERPLAY 
BETWEEN IDENTITY, CRITICAL AGENCY AND SOCIAL 
JUSTICE EDUCATION
D. FRANCIS & A. LE ROUX
Abstract
In this article we use the concepts identity, agency and social justice education 
as a lens to explore the role of life history research in the study of the 
interconnection between emerging teacher identities, critical agency and 
social justice education.  By exploring the life history of a white woman pre-
service teacher, this study foregrounds the use of life history research to help 
teacher educators to understand the contexts through which student 
teachers' identities are constructed, and how these identities feed into agency 
and a stance to bring about social change.
Keywords: life history research; pre-service teachers; teacher education; 
identity; agency; social justice education
1.  INTRODUCTION
Wade, Fauske and Thompson (2008) argue that the goal of preparing 
teachers to be social justice educators, who, in turn, can become agents of 
change in schools, remains elusive. In many ways, they imply a failure on the 
part of teacher educators to share the full responsibility for social change and, 
in fact, the problem often becomes located within our own students (Wade, et 
al., 2008). As researchers and teacher educators, we want to take 
responsibility for this critical aspect of teacher education. South African 
teacher educators and researchers are increasingly addressing forms of anti-
oppressive education by focusing on pre-service teachers' identity, their 
agency to bring about social change, and social justice education (Francis 
and Hemson, 2007a, 2007b; Francis, Hemson, Mphambukeli and Quin, 
2003).
Our study documents the life history of Willemien (a pseudo name), a twenty-
five-year old white woman pre-service teacher. Using life history research, we 
seek to explore her emerging identity as a teacher and how this identity is 
connected to notions of critical agency and a stance towards social justice.  
We address two critical questions: what is her perception of herself as an 
agent of change and how does this perception frame her teacher identity and 
understanding of teaching for social justice?  We chose life histories as a 
method, in line with our view of identity as a resource that people draw on in 
constructing personal narratives, which provide meaning and a sense of 
continuity to their lives.
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